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Fiscal stress and decreasing government budgets have led to renewed interest in voluntary contributions for
the funding of public goods. This paper experimentally examines the Provision Point Mechanism (PPM), a
voluntary contribution mechanism for the funding of lumpy public goods. Previous research has
demonstrated the effectiveness of this mechanism at providing public goods, however all were conducted in
an environment of complete information, which fails to capture the uncertainties of the real world. This study
tests the efficacy of the PPM in informationally limited settings. We find no significant differences in the rate
of successful provisions or level of group contributions when subjects have limited information about the
valuations of others than when they have complete information.
Disciplines
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration | Policy History, Theory, and Methods | Public
Affairs
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/73
"The Effect of Incomplete Information in a 
Threshold Public Goods Experiment" 
96-05-29 
Melanie Marks and Rachel Croson 
THE EFFECT 
OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
IN A THRESHOLD 
PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT 
Melanie Markst 
Rachel T. A. Croson 
96-05-02<f 
Department of Operations and Information Management 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia. PA 19104-6366 
t School of Business and Economics 
Longwood College 
Farmville, VA 32909 
Also available as a working paper of the Risk Management and Decision Processes Center 
The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment 
May6, 1996 
Melanie B. Marks 
School of Business and Economics 
Longwood College 
Farmville, VA23901 
Rachel T.A Croson 
Department of OPIM 
Wharton School ofBusiness 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, P A 19104-6366 
Abstract : 
Fiscal stress and decreasing government budgets have led to renewed interest in voluntary 
contributions for the funding of public goods. This paper examines a voluntary contribution 
mechanism for the funding of lumpy public goods; the Provision Point Mechanism. Previous 
research has shown that this mechanism can be effective at providing public goods (Isaac, 
Sclunidtz and Walker, 1989; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Rapoport 
and Suleiman, 1993). However, these studies were all conducted in an environment of complete 
information about individual preferences, which fails to capture the uncertainties of the real world. 
This study tests the efficacy of the PPM in informationally limited settings and finds that 
incomplete information does not add to coordination problems as compared to complete 
information. In filet, the PPM appears to be more successful in environments where subjects have 
no information than in environments where information is present, but limited. 
•This research was begun while Marks was supported by a grant from the Center on Philanthropy 
and the Lilly Foundation. Thanks to economics and business students at Longwood College for 
help in performing experiments and to participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, 
discussant Mark Isaac and Timothy Gronberg for helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal stress experienced by state and local governments in the United States has resulted 
in budget cuts and a re-allocation of expenditures away from local services and the provision of 
public goods. Recent fiscal stress has also generated an increased interest among public officials 
in alternative institutional arrangements for the delivery of public services. Within the current 
political climate, options circumventing the "T -word," taxes, are particularly attractive. Voluntary 
contribution institutions of the type found in the nonprofit sector offer this feature, and thus 
represent a viable option to supplementing current mechanisms for determining public service 
levels. Perhaps fueled by the public policy interest in non-tax, decentralized methods of public 
finance, the economics literature has rekindled its theoretical interest in voluntary contribution 
models for providing public goods. 
Since many public goods are lumpy (parks, roads, bridges, railway lines, community 
libraries, etc.), 1 an • all or nothing" contribution process, such as a Provision Point Mechanism 
(PPM) may be appropriate. In the typical PPM, the size of a proposed project and the associated 
total cost are predetertnined. Members of the community impacted by the project submit bids 
stating their dollar commitment to covering the project costs. If the sum of contributions do not 
cover the cost of the project, it is not undertaken and all contributions are refunded.1 If the sum 
1 An imponant class of lumpy public goods are euvironmental ones. Taylor and Ward (1980) suggest that 
"Ecological systems sudl as lakes, rivers. the atmospbere, fisheries and so on can normally be exploited up to some 
critical level while largely maintaining their integrity and retaining much of their use value. If exploitation rates 
go beyond that critical level, use values falls catastrophically. • (p. 353). 
1The idea of refunds is tested in Isaac. Schmicllz and Walker (1989). The PPM is more effective in providing 
public goods wben subjeas are offend a money-back guarantee upon a group's failure 10 meet a contribution 
threshold However, the PPM does not have 10 include this feature; for example Asch, Gigliotti and Polito ( 1993) 
use a threshold game without auy such guarantee. 
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of the contributions covers the cost of the project, then the project is provided. Additional 
instirutional rules can be designed to handle the rebate of excess funds. 3 
Niagara Mohawk's Green Choice program is a good example of a PPM being used to fund 
a lumpy project, in this case, an environmentally friendly power station. Participants in the 
program commit to paying a fixed fee which is attached to their electric bilL If enough 
participants are solicited, the power station will be built. 4 
Four studies have tested the efficacy of the PPM and found it to be somewhat reliable. In 
Bagnoli and McKee (1991), groups funded the public good 85.7% of the time, while in the 
money-back-guarantee experiments oflssac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989), groups reach or 
exceed the threshold between 43% and 57"/o of the time. In less continuous settings., Suleiman 
and Rapoport (1992) and Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) find the public good being provided 
between 12% and 85% of the time, depending on the provision point level. 
However, these srudies were all performed under extremely rich informational 
environments. In these experimems, subjects were informed of the induced valuations for the 
public good of all other group members. In a real world environmem, valuations (and 
distributions of those valuations) are generally private rather than public information. The 
question can be raised as to whether or not the success of the PPM, as illustrated in the existing 
studies., would hold up in a world of incomplete information. 
Bagnoli and Lipman ( 1989), which provides the theoretical basis for the Bagnoli and 
McKee (1991) experiments, notes this concern. 
3Provision point mechanisms have the potential to generate a surplus of funds. Marks and Croson (1996) 
iu'lestigate three alternative rebate rules for haDdling the ~ment of excess funds; no rebate, where excess 
funds are wasted, proportional rebate. where excess funds are allocated proportionally to individnal contributions, 
and utilization rebate, where excess funds are used to incii:ase the size of the public project. 
4We thank William Schulze for bringing the Niagara Mohawk Green Choice Project to our anention For more 
details on this program see Schulze (1995). 
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One caveat that must be mentioned is that we assume complete information throughout. 
This is, of course, a very strong assumption and may limit the applicability of our results. 
Intuitively, incomplete information may lead to underprovision as agents tradeoff their 
contribution against the probability that the public good is provided. (p. 585) 
If their intuition proved to be correct, then prior results from PPM experiments would not 
illuminate the usefulness of this mechanism in a real-life implementation. 
The study presented in this paper is designed to address this concern. A PPM is tested 
under three informational environments. Under complete information, subjects know the 
complete distribution of their group's valuations for the public good. This condition is similar to 
those used in previous studies. Under incomplete information-/cn(}Wn sum, subjects know their 
own valuation for the public good and know the sum of their group's valuations. The distribution 
of the valuations, however, is not known. In this intermediate condition, subjects could get a feel 
for how their own valuation compared to the aggregate. With this information they could 
calculate their proportional share of the public good's value that they would receive, along with a 
proportionally fair contribution. In the third treatment, incomplete information-unknown sum, 
subjects know only their own valuation for the public good. No aggregate valuation or 
distribution information is provided. 
While most experiments impose complete information, the third treatment best models a 
real-world environment. Community members who are asked to contribute toward a public good 
presumably know their own preferences, but neither the distribution nor the sum of the rest of the 
community's values. As Bagnoli and Lipman ( 1989) suggest, it is natural to conjecture that this 
severe lack of information would lower the frequency of successful provision. 
However, results from this experiment suggest that incomplete information is not as 
problematic as intuition would lead us to believe. No significant differences in the frequency of 
provision, frequency of equilibrium play, or the absolute level of contributions was found between 
3 
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any of the three treattnems. If anything, the PPM worked even better when subjects had less 
information than when they had more. In the incomplete information-unknown sum treatment, 
contributions converged to the Nash equilibrium contribution level, while no convergence was 
observed in the incomplete information-known sum treatment. 
These results are particularly heartening for economists and policyrnakers searching for 
volumary contribution institutions which could partially substitute for taxation and other forms of 
public goods provision. They suggest that even with sparse information (like that in the real 
world) the PPM will provide a reliable volumary mechanism for the funding of threshold public 
goods. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 descnbes the relevant literarure in public 
goods research. Section 3 outlines the experimental design and procedures and section 4 presents 
the experimental results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Previous Literature 
This study uses a continuous contribution mechanism for a provision point game. 
Although previous studies have used this mechanism, almost all of them involved perfect 
information on the part of the players.s 
Isaac, Schmitz and Walker (1989) use a provision poim payoff function to examine the 
finitely repeated PPM with stable groups of four. Subjects are given complete information about 
their (homogenous) valuations for the public good. This study tests high, medium and low 
provision poims with and without a money-back guarantee. Successful provisions of the public 
good range from 43% to 57%, depending on treatment. 
5For an excellent review of the experimen131 public goods literature see Ledyard (1995) . 
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Bagnoli and McKee ( 1991) test the single streetlight model developed by Bagnoli and 
Lipman ( 1989) in an environment of complete information where groups play repeatedly together. 
A money-back guarantee is offered if the provision point is not met, but there is no rebate in the 
event of an excess. In the experiments of five-person groups the threshold was reached 85.7% of 
the time. 
Suleiman and Rapoport ( 1992) use players with homogenous endowments and valuations 
for the public good and examine changes in the provision level. In this experimem subjects can 
contn'bute up to 5 tokens toward the public good. The public good is provided between 39"/o 
and 85% of the time, depending on the provision point level. Rapoport and Suleiman ( 1993) 
examine a similar environment where endowments (but not valuations) are heterogenous.6 They 
find the public good being provided between 12% and 80% of the time, depending on the 
provision point level. 7.8 
These previous experimental studies of the PPM involved many successful provisions of 
the public good, particularly when the threshold was not "too high" relative to subjects' 
endowments. However, all utilized complete information designs in which subjects were informed 
of each other's value for the public good. This consideration is particularly pressing when we 
6 Although endowments in this experiment were 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 tokens, subjects could not contribute mon: than S 
of tho5e tokens to the public good 
7In addition, Asch, Gigliotti and Polito ( 1993) run one treatment of a threshold public good with complete 
information, homogenous endowments and homogenous valuations. Howe\'ef, rates of successj;J.l provision an: not 
reponed. 
8This literature is related to another which gn:w out of the (numerous) prisoner's dilemma e.xperiments. Provision 
point public goods with binary contributions were lim SIUdied by Van de Kragt. ()rbell and Dawes ( 1983). If at 
least some fraction of subjects in a group contributed their S5 voucher to the public good. all members earned $10. 
Follow-up studies involved the effects on this game of communication (Van de Kragt, Otbell and Dawes, 1983) 
and offering a money back guarantee or enforcing contributions (Dav.-es. Orbell, Sintmons and Van de Kragt. 
1986; Rapoport and Esbed-Levy, 1989). In addition, a number of theories were proposed to explain observed 
behavior, including both decision-theoretic models (Rapoport, 1985; Rapoport, 1987) and equilibrium models 
(Palftey and Rosenthal, 1984; PaJfJey and Rosenthal. 1988). 
5 
. - ... ---- ······· .. .... ··- . .. .. - - ... . . . . .. . .. ... .... .... ....... _ .. __ -- ---.. ---
consider the equilibria of the PPM viewed as a game. These PPM have a continuum of efficient 
Nash equilibria in which the provision point is exactly met, as well as a continuum of inefficient 
Nash equilibria in which the provision point is not met (categorized below). These continua lead 
to a multi-person coordination problem, which information may be crucial to solving.9 
The next section describes the experiment we designed to address this question. 
3. The Experiment 
Procedures 
All sessions in this experiment involved inexperienced subjectS recruited from 
undergraduate classes at Longwood College. The experiment was run by hand, although subjects 
were not pennitted to communicate with each other in any way other than through their decisions 
in the experiment. At the end of the experiment subjects were paid their earnings from their 
decisions in private and in cash. 
Subjects arrived at the experimental laboratory and were randomly assigned to groups of 
five. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects drew cltips from a can to determine which 
valuation they would be assigned. This valuation was equivalent to the amount of cents they 
would receive if the public good was provided. The distribution of valuations used was the same 
in each treatment, (20, 30, 55, 65, 80), although the level of information individuals had about 
others' valuations varied. The groups and valuations remained constant for the entire 25 period 
experimental session. 
In each period, subjects were endowed with 55 tokens. Subjects were publicly told that 
these endowments were homogenous. As in previous public goods experiments (Isaac, Walker 
90ther studies have examined heterogenous valuations and varying information about those valuations for 
continuous public goods. In these games, there is a unique or subgame perfect equilibrium for free riding, thus this 
problem of coordiDation is not as pressing. See Brookshire, Coursey and Redington ( 1990), Fisher, Isaac, 
Schatzberg and Walker (1995) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (forthcoming) for examples. 
6 
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and Williams, 1989; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991) subjects were asked to allocate tokens between a 
Private Account and a Group Account, no mention was made in the experiment of "investments" 
or "contributions." 
The Private Account is equivalent to private consumption and guarantees a value of 1¢ 
per token. The Group Account captures the threshold aspects of the public good. If the group 
allocated 125 tokens to the Group Account each member received their valuation. In all sessions 
of the experiment, a money-back guarantee was offered, thus if the provision point of 125 tokens 
was not met, contributions were returned to their contributors. Tokens allocated to the Group 
Account in excess of the threshold were not returned (this combination of refund and rebate rules 
is the same as those reported in Bagnoli and McKee, 1991}. 
Information 
The first treatment (complete infomzation) involves heterogenous agents operating in an 
environment of complete information. Subjects were told the entire distribution of valuations for 
the public good (20, 30, 55, 65, 80} as well as the sum of those valuations ($2.50}. This 
information was also placed on an overhead screen to create common information among 
subjects. 
In the second treatment (incomplete information-known sum) subjects are told that 
valuations are heterogenous, but that they will not be informed of the distribution. Subjects are, 
however, informed that the sum of the earnings from the group account is $2.50. With this 
information, they can calculate their proportional fair share of the cost threshold. For example, 
the subject whose valuation is 30 cents receives 30/250 = 12% of the benefits from the public 
good, thus a proportionally fair contnoution on his part would involve contributing 12% of the 
tokens necessary to provide the public good ( .12xl25 = 15 tokens). 
In the final treatment (incomplete information-unlcnawn sum) subjects are told that 
valuations are heterogenous and that they will not be informed of the distribution of valuations. 
7 
Subjects were not, however, given any information about the sum of the valuations. Thus 
subjects are not able to use any relative measures offairness to guide their decisions as they could 
in the second treatment. This treatment best captures the incomplete informational conditions of 
the real world. 
Equilibria 
All three treatments reported in this experiment have the same set of Nash equilibria. 
There is a continuum of efficient equilibria in which the provision point is exactly met as well as a 
continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the public good is not provided. The efficient 
equilibria consist of all the vectors in which (1) exactly 125 tokens are allocated to the group 
account and (2) no subject allocates more than his valuation to the group account. If these two 
conditions hold, no subject has any incentive to change his allocation. No such equihorium can 
exist in which more than 125 tokens allocated to the group account, each player would prefer to 
keep the extra tokens and invest them in his private account. 
However, there are also a continuum of inefficient Nash equilibria in which somewhere 
between 0 and 92 tokens are allocated to the group acc<>unt, but no player can or desires to 
unilaterally supplement the account to achieve the provision point. IO 
4. Experimental Results 
Two important results emerge from this experiment; first that the success of the PPM is 
not diminished when information becomes incomplete. Lack of information in the incomplete 
information conditions has no effect on the rate of successful provisions of the public good. The 
second result is that less information may even be a good thing. Contributions in the incomplete 
10An allocation vector like (0,23,23,23,23) )ields 92 tokens in the group account and is a Nash equilibrium. 
Player 1 bas the necessary 33 tokens to supplement the group account. but his bonus is only 20 tokens, thus he bas 
no incentive to do so. No other player bas the necessary 33 tokens, although they each would supplement if they 
could. No equilibrium of this son exists in which 93 • 124 tokens are contributed 
8 
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information-unknown sum condition converge toward the Nash equilibrium, while contributions 
in the incomplete information-unknown sum condition do not converge. Thus it appears that a 
little information (like the sum of the other players' valuations) may prevent convergence. 
The PPM under Incomplete Information 
The proportion of successful provisions of the public good and of Nash equilibria observed 
in each of the three informational conditions are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
S fi I P d N h E Tb " uccess u fOVISIODS an as ~QUII na 
Successful 
Provisions Proportion Equilibria Proportion 
Complete Information 
Group I It 0.44 0 0.00 
Group 2 13 0.52 I 0.04 
Group3 17 0.68 2 0.08 
Group4 9 0.36 1 0.04 
Group 5 10 0.40 1 0.04 
Overall 60 0.48 5 0.04 
Incomplete Information-Sum Known 
Group I 8 0.32 I 0.04 
Group 2 19 0.76 0 0.00 
Group 3 16 0.64 3 0.12 
Group 4 11 0.44 1 0.04 
Group 5 I6 0.64 I 0.04 
Overall 70 0.56 6 0.05 
Incomplete Information-Sum Unknown 
Group 1 19 0.76 0 0.00 
Group2 13 0.52 1 0.04 
Group 3 14 0.56 4 0. 16 
Group4 11 0.44 2 0.08 
Group 5 I 1 0.44 0 0.00 
Overall 68 0.54 7 0.06 
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Using at-test of proponions on independem data points (N=S in each treatment) we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proponions of successful provisions of the public good 
or of equilibria are the same between the three treatments. A similar Mann-Whitney U test on 
absolute numbers of successful provisions or equilibria is similarly insignificant.11 
Thus the effectiveness of the PPM as a mechanism to provide threshold public goods 
appears unaffected by informational incompleteness. This result suggests that even with sparse 
information like that available in the real world, a voluntary mechanism will enable the public 
good to be provided slightly more than half the time. 
In addition to not affecting the proponion of successful provisions or of Nash equilibria, 
incomplete information has no significant effect on the amount of contributions generated. Figure 
1 shows average group contributions under each of the three informational conditions. 
lnsen Figure I around here 
Figure 1 shows contributions averaged over five groups in each treatment. Figures 2, 3 
and 4 below show group comributions over time, which are significantly noisier. 
As can be inruited from this figure, no significant differences between contributions in the 
three treatmems can be found. To see this, we ran a two-factor random effects GLS regression. 
The independent variable in the regression was the total group contribution. lndependem 
variables were dummies for the two incomplete information treatments. The regression was 
stratified by groups, as well as by period. Table 2 descnbes the results of the regression. 
11 For a comparison of successful p!'O\'isions the t-statistic and associated two-Wled p-value for comparisons are: 
Complete information vs Incomplete information-known sum, r-.2540, p=.8052; Complele Information vs 
lncomplele information-unknown sum, r-.2029, p=.8438; Incomplete information-kllown sum vs Incomplete 
information-unknown swn, r-.0509, p=.9605 . A Mann-Whitney U test on the proportions of successful 
provisions }ie!ds similar results: U=9.5, p>.548; U=7.5, p>.310; U=11.5, p>.842 respectively. For the same t-test 
on proportion of equilibria: r-.0617, p=.9522; r-.1184, p=.9083; !=.0570, p=.9558. A Mann-Whitney U test on 
the PJOpOltivns of equilibria yields similar results. U= 12, p= 1.0; U= 12, p= !.0: U=12.5, p> I. 
10 
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Table2 
Two-Fac:tor Random EtTec:ts GLS Regression (Contributions) 
Contributions Coeff SE t-stat p-value 
Constant (Complete) 123.500 1.361 90.772 0.000 
Incomplete--Known 1.160 1.889 0.614 0.539 
Incomplete--Unknown 0.768 1.889 0.407 0.684 
Average contributions in either of the incomplete information conditions were not 
distinguishable from those in the complete information condition. Thus the addition of incomplete 
information to the PPM has none of the negative effects hypothesized by Bagnoli and Lipman 
(1989). The proponion of successful provisions of the public good, the proponion ofNash 
equilibria and the contribution levels are not significantly different between the three treatments. 
Ccmparing CoTfllergence 
However, there is a sense in which a little information turned out to be a dangerous thing 
in this experiment. In both the incomplete information-unknown sum and the complete 
information conditions, group contributions converged toward the equilibrium of 125 over time. 
Thus when subjects either knew everything or knew nothing they moved toward an equilibrium. 
However, in the incomplete information-known sum treatment no convergence was observed. 
Thus when subjects had a little knowledge (they knew the sum of the valuations of the other 
subjects but not their distribution) no convergence was observed. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show 
contributions in each of the three treatments broken out by group. 
Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 about here 
These figures suggest that group contributions converge toward the equilibrium of 125 in 
some treatments and not in others. 
11 
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To test convergence statistically we ran three separate one-way random effects GLS 
regressions, one for each treatment. In each, the dependent variable was the absolute distance of 
a group's contribution from the equihorium contribution of 125 tokens, and the independent 
variables were the period number and the period number squared. The regressions were stratified 
by group but not by period number. Convergence over time toward the equihorium will show up 
as a significantly negative coefficient on period, while nonlinear convergence will show up as a 
significant coefficient on period squared. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3. 
Table3 
One-Way Random Effects GLS Regressions (Diffi25) 
Complete Information 
Diffl25 Coeff SE t-stat p-value 
Constant 15.120 2.732 5.534 0.000 
Period -1.025 0.364 -2.816 0.005 
Period Squared 0.029 0.014 2.116 0.034 
Incomplete Information-Sum !Vrown 
Diffl25 Coeff SE t-stat p-value 
Constant 10.518 2.403 4.377 0.000 
Period -0.210 0.304 -0.690 0.490 
Period Squared 0.002 0.011 0.140 0.889 
Incomplete Information-Sum Unlawwn 
Diffl25 Coeff SE t-stat p-value 
Constant 13.660 2.799 4.881 0.000 
Period -0.942 0.346 -2.719 0.007 
Period Squared 0.023 0.013 1.747 0.081 
Although the graph of contributions under complete information looks noisy (see Figure 
2), statistical analysis suggests that groups actually converge toward the Nash equihorium 
outcome of contributions equaling the provision point. In the middle information condition 
12 
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(incomplete informatia-known sum), no convergence is observed, either in Figure 3 or 
statistically. However, tmder incomplete information--unknown sum, groups clearly converge 
toward the equilibrium contribution level of 125, both in Figure 4 and statistically. 
The results of dliS: experiment provide relatively good news for the voluntary provision of 
public goods. The une~pected success of the PPM under incomplete information suggests that it 
may be a viable opti011in.real world public good provision. And the strong convergence toward 
the Nash equihorium -a that treatment suggests that such successful behavior is stable. 
S. Discussion and C..mtsion 
This study adckesses a previously noted limitation to the literature on the Provision Point 
Mechanism; the assuDiption of complete information. The results indicate that, contrary to 
intuition, incomplete illfurmation of valuations for the public good does not add to coordination 
failure. The proportiooofsuccessful provisions of the public good, proportions ofNash equihoria 
reached and absolute level of contributions do not differ across the three informational treatments. 
The most surprising result of the study is that in the context of a PPM a little knowledge 
can be a dangerous thiDg. When decision groups were only informed about their private 
valuations but could llllt compare this to an aggregate group valuation, contributions converged 
to the Nash equilibrium amount of 125. No similar convergence was found when groups were 
informed of their owu valuations and had information about the aggregate group valuation. 
The results of this stUdy shed favorable light on the PPM. Agents in the nonprofit sector, 
politicians and firms involved in projects such as Niagara Mohawk should be encouraged by the 
conclusions. This research, combined with existing studies, offers evidence that in appropriate 
settings, the PPM is a reasonable mechanism to consider when trying to fund lumpy public goods. 
Further testing of the PPM under different environments will add to our body of knowledge and 
will aid policy makers in choosing the most appropriate implementation of the mechanism. 
13 
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